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REPUTATION OF VICTIM ON SELF DEFENSE
REPUTATION OF THE VICTIM ON THE ISSUE OF SELF-
DEFENSE IN MISSOURI
BY RUTH E. BATES
When the issue of self-defense is raised in a trial for homicide
or assault with intent to kill, two major questions arise: first,
Under what circumstances and subject to what limitations may
the defendant offer evidence of the bad reputation of the victim
for violence? and second, Under what circumstances may the
state offer evidence of the good reputation of the victim?
The defendant is on trial for the wrongful taking of the life
of another, his own life being at stake. He admits the killing,
but by pleading self-defense alleges that it was not wrongful,
but was necessary as a protection to his own life and therefore
excusable. In so doing the defendant changes the issues of the
case by adding his own charge that the victim attempted to
commit a crime upon him. There is then a combined case of the
state against the accused and the accused against the victim.
I. ADMISSIBILITY OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE REGARDING THE VICTIM,
OFFERED BY THE ACCUSED
It is a general rule that on a trial for homicide, evidence of the
character of the victim is not admissible.- The state is not per-
mitted to prove his good character, nor is the accused permitted
to prove his reputation for violence. "The rule is based upon the
ground that character is not involved in the issue, and, conse-
quently, evidence in regard to it is immaterial. ' ' 2 Another rea-
son given is that "the law protects everyone from unlawful
violence regardless of character, and the service done the com-
munity in ridding it of a violent and dangerous man is, in the
eyes of the law, no justification of the slayer.' 3
"But the rule is otherwise where the plea of self-defense is
interposed and the evidence before the jury leaves it in doubt
whether the deceased was the aggressor, or where the circum-
stances attending the homicide render it doubtful or equivocal
'124 Am. St. Rep. 1019; 13 R. C. L. 916; L. R. A. 1916A 1266; 2 L. R. A,
(N. S.) 102; 4 Ann. Cas. 338; 4 Elliott, EVIDENCE, Sec. 3038; 30 C. J. Secs.
394-397; State v. Jackson (1853), 17 Mo. 544.
'4 Ann. Cas. 338.
2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102.
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whether the defendant was justified in believing himself in im-
minent danger at the hands of the deceased."'4 It should be
borne in mind that the plea of self-defense raises two distinct
issues, namely, who was the aggressor, and did the accused act
reasonably in defending himself?5 In considering these issues
there arises in each a question as to the relevancy of evidence of
the victim's reputation for violence, together with the subsidiary
question as to the bearing of the accused's knowledge of the vic-
tim's reputation upon its relevancy.
A. The Issue of the Reasonableness of the Accused's Act
Assuming for the present that there is an issue of aggres-
sion, the reputation of the victim for violence, if known to the
accused, has an obvious bearing upon the issue of the reasonable-
ness of his act, and the great weight of authority concedes its
admissibility.6 Here knowledge by the accused is essential; for
the purpose of the evidence being to show the accused's state of
mind and to explain his conduct at the time of the encounter,
it is clear that the.victim's reputation, as affecting the accused's
apprehensions, must have been known to him.
The Missouri decisions are in accord in holding evidence of the
character of the victim admissible in support of this issue, sub-
ject to certain limitations. There must be doubt as to whether
the defendant acted maliciously or from a well-grounded appre-
hension of danger or as to who was the assailant. The reputa-
tion must relate to violence, turbulence or quarrelsomeness ;7 it
must be general, evidence of specific acts of violence having been
repeatedly rejected ;8 and it must relate to the victim's reputa-
tion at the time of the tragedy9 in the community in which he
'13 R. C. L. 916.
Logically the question of aggression would seem to precede the question
of the reasonableness of the accused's act, but for the purposes of our dis-
cussion the issues will be treated in the inverse order.
'124 Am. St. Rep. 1029, and cases cited therein; 11 Ann. Cas. 229; 13
R. C. L. 918; L. R. A. 1916A 1266; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102; 30 C. J. Sec.
466; 2 Jones, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.), 1231; 1 Wigrnore, Evi-
DENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 63; 4 Elliott, EVIDENCE, See. 3038; 4 Ann. Cas. 338.
'State v. Colvin (1910), 226 Mo. 446, 126 S. W. 448; State v. Roach
(1896), 64 Mo. A. 413.
' State v. Roberts (1922), 294 Mo. 284, 242 S. W. 669; State v. Woods
(1918), 274 Mo. 610, 204 S. W. 21; State v. Jones (1896), 134 Mo. 254, 35
S. W. 607; State v. Elkins (1876), 63 Mo. 159; State v. Green (1910), 229
Mo. 642, 129 S. W. 700.
'State v. Pettit (1894), 119 Mo. 410, 24 S. W. 1014.
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resides. 0 The limitation or requisite of admissibility with which
we are herein primarily concerned is knowledge.
There is a seeming confusion in the Missouri cases as to the
necessity of knowledge by the accused of the victim's reputation
on the issue of reasonableness of the accused's act, but it is more
apparent than real. It is believed that the confusion will be
largely removed if it is borne in mind that the plea of self-de-
fense raises two distinct issues; namely, aggression and the
reasonableness of the accused's act. So far as the issue of
reasonableness is concerned it is hardly possible that any court
would attempt to dispense with the element of knowledge, but,
as will be shown later, knowledge is a factor of no importance
on the issue of aggression.
The first case'1 which raises the question of knowledge by the
accused of the victim's reputation for violence as a requisite of
admissibility is State v. Hicks. 2 The court, in approving an in-
struction asked for by the accused himself, expressly makes
knowledge of the reputation of the victim by the accused a
requisite of its consideration by the jury in determining whether
the accused had reason to apprehend danger. The court says the
law permits a man to act on reasonable fear, ". . . and there-
fore, when the killing has been under circumstances that create
a doubt as to whether the act was committed in malice or from a
sense of real danger, the jury have the right to consider any
testimony that will explain the motive that prompted the ac-
cused."
The next group of cases,1' relying upon the Hicks case, admit
character evidence for the purpose of showing the motive which
prompted the act of the accused. While they are silent upon
the element of knowledge, the entire argument implies knowl-
edge on the defendant's part as a requisite of admissibility on
the issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's fear.
These cases are definitely reinforced by State v. Brown14 and
* State v. Roberts (1922), 294 Mo. 284, 242 S. W. 669.
All cases discussed are homicide cases unless otherwise indicated.
(1859), 27 Mo. 588.
u State v. Keene (1872), 50 Mo. 357; State v. Bryant (1874), 55 Mo. 75;
State v. Elkins (1876), 63 Mo. 159; State v. Downs (1886), 91 Mo. 19, 3
S. W. 219.
1, (1876), 63 Mo. 439.
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State v. Kennade.15 In the latter case the court says: "Even if
deceased had a reputation for being quarrelsome and dangerous,
evidence of it could not have been received unless it had been
previously shown that defendant knew it, and therefore might
more reasonably apprehend danger in certain circumstances,
than if that reputation had been different." The Hicks case is
relied upon as authority for the rule.
Up to this time the rule is clear, but State v. Feeley,-8 decided
by the Supreme Court, starts trouble. The question directly in-
volved in this case was whether the state could offer evidence of
the victim's good reputation when not drinking, to rebut the evi-
dence offered by the accused of the victim's bad reputation when
drinking. The court ruled that the state's offer was good since
the victim's reputation when drinking was but one trait of his
general character which had been attacked. It appeared that
the accused did not have knowledge of the victim's reputation,
but the admission of the evidence was not objected to by the
state. However, the court goes into a long discussion of the
question of knowledge as a requisite of admissibility of character
evidence and, after reviewing the law on the subject, which it
says has been conflicting, overrules the Kennade case and, rely-
ing upon the cases which are silent upon the question of knowl-
edge, sets up the rule that the accused need have no knowledge
of the reputation of the victim as a prerequisite of admissibility."7
Two subsequent cases 8 ignore the Feeley decision and hold
that it is a well-settled rule that where there is an issue as to
whether the accused acted maliciously if from a well-grounded
apprehension of danger the reputation of the victim is admis-
sible. It does not appear whether the accused had knowledge of
that reputation.
But State -v. Stubblefield,29 a prosecution for assault with in-
tent to kill, cites the Feeley case with approval and rules that
the instruction of the trial court covering the victim's reputa-
tion for violence should be made to conform to the principle an-
nounced in State v. Feeley.
"(1894), 121 Mo. 405, 26 S. W. 437.
" (1905), 194 Mo. 300, 92 S. W. 663, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 351.
"It is felt that the court may have had in mind the issue of aggression.
State v. Zorn (1907), 202 Mo. 12, 100 S. W. 591; State v. Green (1910),
229 Mo. 642, 129 S. W. 700.
' (1911), 239 Mo. 526.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/2
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The rule in Missouri, although slightly ambiguous up to this
time, is greatly clarified by State v. Barrett,20 on the issue of the
reasonableness of the accused's act.21 In the Barrett case State
v. Feeley is reversed and the rule of the Kennade case is re-
established. The defendant pleaded self-defense to the charge
of murder and asked for an instruction regarding the evidence
of the bad reputation of the victim, to the effect that the jury be
permitted to consider the evidence "for the purpose of throwing
light upon the conduct and demeanor of the deceased during the
difficulty between him and the defendant, and also for the pur-
pose of throwing light upon the defendant's apprehensions, if
any, at the time of the shooting." This instruction was refused
and an instruction was given that the jury might consider the
evidence if the defendant had knowledge of it, as a circumstance
in determining the reasonable cause of the defendant's appre-
hension of great personal injury. Thus the use of the evidence
was limited to the issue of whether the defendant acted mali-
ciously or in self-defense. The court says, "It is clear that the
evidence tending to show the reputation of the deceased as a
dangerous man could not have affected defendant's apprehen-
sions if unknown to him, and to that extent the court did not err
in thus refusing the defendant's instruction."
However, a subsequent civil case for assault and battery, in
holding that the issue of self-defense puts the character of the
plaintiff in issue, and that the defendant may attack his reputa-
tion before he himself puts it in issue, cites the Feeley case as
"the rule of the court at this time. ' '22
Hence starting with the Hicks case, which makes knowledge a
requisite of admissibility, we find a subsequent line of cases up
to the Kennade case which discuss the question from the stand-
point of the reasonableness of the accused's act and follow the
Hicks case, apparently presupposing knowledge by the accused.
The Kennade case expressly makes knowledge a requisite. State
v. Feeley may be set aside in a discussion of this issue for the
reasons that, first, the opinion does not show a thorough ex-
(1912), 240 Mo. 161, 144 S. W. 485.
But the rule laid down on the issue of aggression is one which cannot in
reason be supported. See infra.
"Davenport v. Silvey (1915), 265 Mo. 543, 178 S. W. 168, L. R. A. 1916A
1266.
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amination or a fair construction of the cases upon which it bases
its rule, and, second, because the element of knowledge was not
an issue either at the trial or on appeal and any discussion of it
is dictum. State v. Zorn and State v. Green are of little conse-
quence since they do not discuss the element of knowledge. State
v. Stubblefield, in its approval of the Feeley case, fails to dis-
close the issues with which it is concerned, saying merely that
the instruction concerning the reputation of the victim should
be made to conform to the views expressed in State v. Feeley.
It cannot be regarded as authority of any kind. 23  Nor can
Davenport v. Silvey be regarded as authority on this issue. The
controversy there was whether the defendant had the right to
attack the reputation of the plaintiff in the first instance.
Knowledge was not in issue. In endorsing the rule of the Feeley
case the court completely overlooked State v. Barrett, as well as
all previous decisions.
We cannot help but conclude that the Barrett case, which con-
tains a thorough review of all previous decisions, definitely es-
tablished the rule that when the only issue to be determined is
whether the accused acted maliciously or from a well-grounded
apprehension of danger, it having been shown that the victim
was the aggressor, the reputation of the victim for violence is
admissible only if known to the accused.24
B. The issue of aggression
There has been an almost universal failure to distinguish be-
tween the purposes for which evidence of the violent character
of the victim is offered. 25 But generally2G where the attention of
Even if it is regarded as authority it is overruled by the subsequent
decision of the Barrett case.
In State v. Turnbo (Mo. 1924), 267 S. W. 847, it was held error to re-
fuse to permit the defendant to show that the victim bore a general repu-
tation for being dangerous, turbulent and quarrelsome. State v. Freeman(1877), 3 Mo. A. 591; State v. Hayden (1884), 83 Mo. 198.
' "The reason for the hesitation, once observable in many courts, in recog-
nizing this sort of evidence, and the source of much confusion upon
the subject, was the frequent failure to distinguish this use of the de-
ceased's character from another use, perfectly well-settled, but subject to
a peculiar limitation not here necessary,--the use of communicated char-
acter for violence to show the reasonableness of the defendant's appre-
hension of violence . . . and hence, an early ruling excluding the
present use of the evidence cannot always be taken as a repudiation of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/2
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the courts has been clearly called to this distinction it has been
held that character evidence of the victim is admissible as tend-
ing to corroborate evidence of the accused as to who was the ag-
gressor, whether the accused knew of such character or not.27
Here the element of knowledge is immaterial since the ques-
tion is what the victim probably did, and not what the accused
thought he was going to do. "The inquiry is one of objective
occurrence, not of subjective belief. '28
The Missouri courts, except for the Barrett case, have been
silent on this issue. An early case 2 9 excluded character evidence
because it appeared that the accused was the aggressor. The
court opens the door for admission of character evidence to ex-
plain the act of the partes by saying, "There may be cases where
the general character would be proper evidence before the jury;
it would explain the situation of the parties, and their acts and
deeds at the time." Again in State v. Rider"0 the court approves
the use of character evidence on the issue of aggression, saying:
"The jury had a right to consider the threats made by the de-
ceased and his character as a turbulent, dangerous man in de-
termining the question as to who was the assailant, he or the
defendant, and whether defendant had reasonable ground to ap-
prehend, and did apprehend, that he was in imminent danger of
sustaining great bodily harm at the hands of the deceased."
Neither case discusses knowledge, nor is either case cited or dis-
cussed in subsequent decisions.
The Barrett case addressed itself to two issues, the first re-
lating to the reasonableness of the accused's conduct, and the
present principle, but is often merely a ruling that the offer does not satisfy
the doctrine of communicated character; and such a court may in future
recognize the present doctrine if the distinction is pressed upon it. Apart
from a few such precedents, the principle is now generally accepted." 1
Wigmore, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 63; L. R. A. 1916A 1266; 2 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 102.
The Barrett case excepted.
People v. Lamar (1906), 148 Cal. 564, 83 P. 993; State v. Beird (1902),
118 Ia. 474, 92 N. W. 694; State v. Jones (1914), 48 Mont. 505, 139 P. 441;
State v. Byrd (1897), 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 363; State v. Thompson
(1907), 49 Or. 46, 88 P. 583; State v. Barber (1907), 13 Ida. 65, 88 P. 418;
State v. Adamo (1922), 120 Wash. 268, 207 P. 7.
1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 63.
U State v. Jackson (1853), 17 Mo. 544, a prosecution for assault with in-
tent to kill.
" (1886), 90 Mo. 54, 1 S. W. 825.
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second relating to the question of aggression. As heretofore
pointed out it established the law of Missouri on the first issue
on a sound basis by calling attention to the weaknesses and fal-
lacies of the Feeley case, but when it took up the second issue,
namely that of aggression, it introduced into the Missouri law
a new element of confusion. It framed the question of aggres-
sion 1 and answered it with authority for the issue of reasonable-
ness, 32 failing to recognize the logical relevancy of character evi-
dence on the issue of aggression on grounds quite distinct from
those which obtain on the issue of reasonableness. Wigmore 3
criticizes the opinion for its failure to note the necessary dis-
tinctions between the two issues.
It is felt that the problem did not receive the consideration to
which it is entitled and that the solution reached by the Barrett
case should not be accepted without further discussion of the
merits of the question. The Barrett case is not entitled to stand
as the final word in Missouri on this issue.
The general rule that uncommunicated threats are inadmis-
sible because the defendant could not have been influenced by
them unless he knew of them,34 is subject to an exception that
in cases of homicide, where there is an issue of self-defense, they
are admissible to throw light upon the occurrence and to show
who was the aggressor.35 This exception has been recognized by
"t 240 Mo. 1. c. 171: "Was the defendant entitled to the instruction direct-
ing the jury that they might consider such testimony (the reputation of
the victim for violence) for the purpose of explaining the conduct of the
deceased during the difficulty?"
' 240 Mo. 1. c. 172, "The wilful killing of a human being is presumptively
murder and therefore in such case malice may be presumed, and there may
be evidence tending to prove malice. To negative malice the character of
the assailant as a dangerous man, if known, is held admissible because it
tends to prove that the killing was from a sense of danger, but as a sense
of danger by reason of deceased's character could not exist unless the de-
fendant had knowledge thereof it necessarily follows that in the absence of
such knowledge such evidence can have no bearing upon the issue whether
the killing was from malice or from a sense of danger." The court dis-
cusses the previous cases which deal only with the issue of reasonableness
and holds that the Feeley case is out of line.
'1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.), Sec. 63: "It is strange that the court is
unable to see the point."
13 R. C. L. 920; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523.
' "It is the fact of his design, irrespective of its communication to the
defendant that is evidential." 1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 110; 13
R. C. L. 920; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523; 1 McClain, CRIMINAL LAW, Sec. 307;
4 Elliott, EVIDENCE, Sec. 3035.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/2
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the Missouri courts.36  In State v. Spencer;3 the court says:
"A great array of authorities is marshalled to sustain the propo-
sition that uncommunicated threats made by the deceased are
admissible when there is doubt as to who is the aggressor, in
an affray, as tending to prove who was in fact the aggressor, but
there is no doubt this is the law. It has been iterated and re-
iterated by this court."
The admission of character evidence unknown to the accused
has been likened to the admission of uncommunicated threats as
evidencing the aggression of the victim.38 It is said in People v.
Lamar :-
"The philosophy which supports this rule as to the admis-
sibility of evidence of such threats, where it is otherwise in
doubt from the evidence who was the assailant, is that it is
more probable that one who has made threats of hostile in-
tention towards another would, when opportunity permits,
attempt to carry such threats into execution and become the
assailant, than would one who has made no such threats or
declared no such intention. So, too, with reference to the
admissibility of evidence of the reputation of deceased as
being a violent, turbulent, dangerous man, such proof, when
the evidence as to who was the assailant is in doubt, for a
similar philosophic reason should be permitted; it being
more probable that one bearing such reputation would pre-
"State v. Nelson (1901), 166 Mo. 191; State v. Smith (1901), 164 Mo.
567; State v. Kelleher (1907), 201 Mo. 614, 100 S. W. 470; State v. Sloan
(1871), 47 Mo. 604; State v. Bailey (1887), 94 Mo. 311; State v. Harrod
(1890), 102 Mo. 590; State v. Alexander (1877), 66 Mo. 148--"Where there
is evidence tending to show an assault first made by deceased, evidence of
threats, made by deceased, whether communicated to defendant or not, are
admissible as bearing directly upon that important question which the jury
must determine before making their verdict."
(1901), 160 Mo. 118.
- People v. Lamar (1906), 148 Cal. 564, 83 P. 993; State v. Beird (1902),
118 Ia. 474, 92 N. W. 694; State v. Jones (1914), 48 Mont. 505, 139 P. 441;
("Such evidence serves the same purpose as uncommunicated threats, which
are always admissible when the question is in doubt, in order to enable the
jury to determine who probably brought on the conflict.") ; State v. Byrd
(1897), 121 N. C. 684, 28 S. E. 663; State v. Thompson (1907), 49 Or. 46,
88 P. 583 ("Evidence of the turbulent character of the victim of an assault
or homicide, unknown to the defendant, has been regarded as admissible
for the same reason and purpose as evidence of uncommunicated threats.") ;
L. R. A. 1916A 1266; 1 McClain, CRIMINAL LAW, Sec. 307; 1 Wigmore,
EVmIENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 63.
- (1906), 148 Cal. 564, 83 P. 993.
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cipitate a deadly contest than would one having no such
reputation."
The Barrett case denies the similarity between the two kinds
of evidence but little reasoning is advanced by the court, and it
disposes of the question with the following remarks :40
"It is urged that as uncommunicated threats were admis-
sible to explain the conduct and demeanor of the deceased
at the time of the homicide, and to show who was the ag-
gressor, by analogy testimony showing that deceased was
a dangerous man should be admitted for the same purpose;
but there is plainly such close connection between a threat
to kill and an attempt to do the act threatened, and such a
lack of it between evidence of the bad character of the de-
ceased unknown to the defendant, and the homicide, that
the competency of the former cannot be considered as af-
fording a reason for the competency of the latter. If the
defendant knew he was dealing with a dangerous man his
apprehension and right to act should be gauged according to
such knowledge and the surrounding facts and circum-
stances. But if he did not know whether the deceased was
a dangerous or peaceable man his right to act from appre-
hension of danger and in self-defense could not have been
affected by the reputation of his assailant."
It is difficult to understand the view that the fact of the de-
fendant's knowledge of the victim's reputation could have any
effect upon the use of such evidence to show a probability that
the victim was the aggressor. Would it be more probable that
the victim acted in a certain manner if the accused knew he had
a bad reputation? Would the jury be more apt to misuse char-
acter evidence if the defendant had no knowledge of it than if
he had? Logically there can be no basis for such a theory.
Nor can it be said that in all instances uncommunicated
threats are more logically relevant to the probability of the vic-
tim's having done the act alleged than is evidence of his
character. A knowledge of human nature will show that the
man who goes around making threats--conceded to be admis-
sible-is no more dangerous or apt to do a particular criminal
act than is the tight-mouthed criminal whose thoughts are sel-
dom imparted to others.
It is not necessary to argue that evidence of the bad character
" 24 Mo. 1. c. 175.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/2
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of the victim would have just as much weight with the jury as
would evidence of uncommunicated threats. Our concern is with
the logical relevancy of the evidence, which is a fundamental
requisite of admissibility.
We recognize character as a reasonable index to conduct. It
has been said that conduct conforms to character.41 It would
seem natural that a man's character would throw light upon the
probability of his having done a particular act, it being more
probable that a man of violent and dangerous character would
make an unprovoked assault.
This principle is recognized in permitting the defendant to
put his good character into issue to show the probability that
he did not do the particular act with which he is charged ;42 or in
a case where self-defense is pleaded to show the improbability
of his having started the affray.43 The same logic would seem
to apply in admitting evidence of the victim's character to show
the probability of his having been the aggressor in the en-
counter, whether known to the accused or not.44
1, . . good conduct is evidence of good character. General good
reputation, the fruit of good conduct, is usually requisite in proof of good
character, but the rule excluding the good conduct itself and requiring evi-
dence of reputation is not based upon such conduct's lack of tendency to
prove good character. In fact the admission of evidence of general good
reputation necessarily is predicated upon and a recognition of such a
tendency, and formerly specific acts of good conduct were permitted to be
shown in proof of good character. These are now, generally, excluded
because a contrary rule would result in 'surprise and a confusion of issues'
. . . and not because they lack probative force." State v. Turner (1912),
246 Mo. 598, 152 S. W. 313, Ann. Cas. 1914B 451. ". . . the law pre-
sumes that a man whose chacter is good is less likely to commit a crime
than one whose character is not good. " State v. Maupin (1906), 196
Mo. 164, 93 S. W. 379.
" "Nothing is better settled than that evidence of general character is
competent for the accused in all criminal trials. The reasonable operation
of such evidence is to create a presumption that a person of good character
was not likely to have committed the act imputed to him; that there is some
mistake or misrepresentation in the evidence on the part of the prosecu-
tion, and it is strictly admissible evidence in the case." State v. O'Conner
(1861), 31 Mo. 389; State v. Alexander (1877), 66 Mo. 148; State v.
Howell (1890), 100 Mo. 628; State v. Maupin (1906), 196 Mo. 164, 93 S. W.
379.
" State v. Shoultz (1857), 25 Mo. 128; State v. Turner (1912), 246 Mo.
598, 152 S. W. 313, Ann. Cas. 1914B 451.
"Although desperate character does not prove the commission of a crime,
"It does increase the probability of the other evidence tending to show that
he (the victim) commenced the affray, and that his attack was felonious
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Writers on the subject have agreed that there is an evidential
value in evidence of the victim's character of which the accused
should not be deprived. 45 The general rule is stated to be "that
wherever it becomes necessary to determine the intent of the
deceased, or whether or not he was the aggressor, evidence of his
violent and dangerous character or reputation is admissible on
behalf of the defendant, whether known to him or not."4
In the field of evidence everything which is logically relevant
to the issue is admissible unless there are considerations of
policy to exclude it 4 7 or limitations which qualify it. Having
pointed out the logical relevancy of character evidence of the
victim, even though unknown to the accused, on the issue of ag-
and intended to do the defendant great bodily harm. The claim that the
defendant acted in self-defense, if indicated by the other evidence, would
be more readily believed concerning a violent and dangerous man than a
peaceable and quiet one, and any mind searching fo;r the truth and in doubt
would naturally be affected by such evidence. The defendant's knowledge
or want of knowledge of the deceased's character can have nothing to do
with its value as evidence for the purpose stated. Its object was to ren-
der more probable the other evidence in the case which tended to show that
the deceased was the aggressor, and that the nature of his attack was such
as to justify the defendant in resorting to violence to repel it or to save
his own life, and is not affected in the slightest by the defendant's previous
knowledge. Its value comes from the fact that the deceased was one who
was apt or likely to do what is imputed to him, and not from the defend-
ant's knowledge of such fact." State v. Thompson (1907), 49 Or. 46, 88
P. 583. ". . . for it is entirely in accord with everyday experience that
a turbulent, violent man is more aggressive and will more readily bring on
an encounter than one who is of the contrary disposition." State v. Jones
(1914), 48 Mont. 505.
"It has been held that when there is evidence tending to show that the
defendant acted in self-defense, proof that the deceased was a violent and
dangerous man is competent, whether such fact was, known to the defend-
ant or not, for the purpose of aiding the jury in determining who was in
fact the aggressor, and the nature and character of the assault if one was
made by the deceased." 11 Ann. Cas. 229. "When the evidence is intro-
duced for the purpose of showing that the deceased was the aggressor or
to explain his acts, the belief of the prisoner is not involved in the inquiry,
and the evidence of character is properly admitted although it may not
have been shown that the prisoner had any knowledge or information there-
of." 13 R. C. L. 918; L. R. A. 1916A 1266; 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 102; 1 Mc-
Clain, CRIMINAL LAW, Sec. 307; 4 Elliott, EVIDENCE, Sec. 3038; 30 C. J.
Sec. 466; 1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.), Sec. 63.
124 Am. St. Rep. 1019.
"It is the policy of the law and not the lack of evidential value and
relevancy which precludes the state from showing the bad character of the
accused as tending to prove that he was the aggressor, or a man likely to
do the particular act charged, in the first instance.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss3/2
REPUTATION OF VICTIM ON SELF DEFENSE
gression, it remains to be determined whether there are con-
siderations to exclude it or qualifications and limitations to be
attached to it.
Admitting that the reputation of a party is the type of evi-
dence to which a jury is inclined to give more weight than is
merited, it is felt that this alone should not exclude evidence of
the bad reputation of the victim, unknown to the accused, as
bearing upon the issue of aggression. It has been said that
the jury may fail to give careful consideration to character evi-
dence in its relation to the legal problems and requirements of
proving self-defense and that it might decide for the defendant
merely because he was confronted by a man of bad character
and that society should not condemn the accused for killing a
man of whom it is well rid.
These are the same perils which led to the well-established
rule precluding the state from showing the bad character of the
accused in the first instance, and so it may be argued that the
defendant should be precluded from showing the victim's bad
character in the first instance. But we may answer this argu-
ment in many ways. First, this objection goes to the time of
admission of character evidence of the victim rather than to a
policy of exclusion on grounds of irrelevancy or historical
precedent. Second, it is the policy of the law to be extremely
favorable to one accused of crime in helping him to justify or
minimize the results of his act, and he is entitled to put before
the jury all the extenuating circumstances surrounding the en-
counter.' Third, if a jury is apt to misuse character evidence
it is no more apt to do so when the accused offers the victim's
bad character to prove that he was the kind of man who might
have done the act charged by the accused, than when the ac-
cused offers his own good character to prove that he is not the
type of man who would have done the act charged by the state.4 9
Garner v. State (1891), 28 Fla. 113, 9 So. 835.
Let us suppose a case. The state has accused the defendant of homi-
cide. It is the duty of the jury to consider all the facts and circumstances
presented in evidence and to find the prisoner guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt or to acquit him. The evidence before the jury, excluding evidence of
the defendant's good character, offered to show the probability that he did
not do the act charged, is such that the jury is about to render a verdict of
guilt-beyond a reasonable doubt. But upon considering the defendant's
good character a reasonable doubt of guilt is created. Then suppose self-
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In both instances the evidence is offered toward the same end-
i. e., to prove the innocence of the accused. Fourth, as a practi-
cal matter-assuming for the moment that the jury will misuse
character evidence-is there any reason to believe that the un-
known reputation of the victim, as tending to show aggression,
carefully guarded by an appropriate instruction, will be used
more prejudicially than the known reputation of the victim, as
tending to show the defendant's reason to believe himself in
danger of great bodily harm also carefully guarded by an ap-
propriate instruction? When character evidence is before the
jury it will have its prejudicial effect, if any, regardless of the
purpose for which it is admitted or the -instruction under which
it is given to the jury.
It is submitted that there is no policy of the law to exclude
character evidence of the victim as tending to show aggression,
the policy of the law being rather one of favoritism toward the
defendant. The logical and legal relevancy of reputation evi-
dence having been shown, we have only to consider the advisi-
bility of placing limitations upon its use.
The defendant may offer evidence of his good character at any
time during the trial" the only check upon the prejudicial effect
of this evidence being one of instruction that the jury may not
base its verdict entirely upon the defendant's good character.51
defense is added to the case. The defendant has admitted the killing but
says it was essential to the preservation of his own life. The duty of the
jury is altered from finding that the defendant actually killed the victim,
to finding that the defendant did not act in self-defense, beyond a reason-
able doubt, or to acquit him. The evidence presented, aside from the re-
putation of the victim, does not create a reasonable doubt of defendant's
guilt and logically a verdict of guilty would result. But upon consideration
of the fact that the victim was a man of bad character and likely to start a
quarrel the jury is then able to say that there is a doubt as to the fact
that defendant's act was malicious. In both cases it is the defendant's
privilege to put character into issue, but this fact is easily explained by
the above-mentioned policy of affording the defendant every possible cir-
cumstance which may tend to show his innocence. In both cases, too, it is
the privilege of the state to offer rebuttal evidence which is a sufficient
check upon manufactured evidence. This problem does not concern us
as it is a matter of credibility rather than admissibility and is for the jury.
' State v. O'Connor (1861), 31 Mo. 389; State v. Maupin (1906), 196 Mo.
164, 93 S. W. 379.
' "It is not a shield from the consequences of a criminal act, proved to
the satisfaction of the jury." 13 R. C. L. 914; 11 Ann. Cas. 1192. In State
v. McNamara (1889), 100 Mo. 100, it was held proper to refuse an instruc.
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However, it would be wise to attach an additional safeguard to
the admission of evidence of the unknown reputation of the
victim. This safeguard is one which is adopted in the admis-
sion of threats52 and known reputation of the victim53-namely,
that there be some other evidence of the victim's aggression, thus
removing all the theoretical argument that the jury could base
its verdict upon evidence of character alone.
Wigmore approves this limitation. He says:
"There ought, of course, to be some other appreciable evi-
dence of the deceased's aggression, for the character-evi-
dence can hardly be of value unless there is otherwise a fair
possibility of doubt on the point; moreover, otherwise the
deceased's bad character is likely to be put forward to serve
improperly as a mere excuse for the killing, under the pre-
text of evidencing his aggression, and it is often feasible to
obtain untrustworthy character-testimony for that purpose.
In short, the same reasons for caution apply as in the case
of uncommunicated threats when offered as involving a
design of aggression, and thus evidencing a probable ag-
gression, on the part of the deceased."'5
In People v. Lamar,"5 the court comes to a similar conclusion
in the following words:
"Hence we think the rule should be that whenever the
circumstances of a case permit of the admission of evidence
of threats made by the deceased against the defendant,
either communicated or uncommunicated, evidence of the
reputation of the deceased as being a violent, quarrelsome,
dangerous man, either known or unknown to the defendant,
is equally admissible, the consideration of the jury to be
limited by proper instructions of the court, where the repu-
tation is unknown to the defendant, to the same extent that
the law limits the consideration by them of uncommunicated
threats--to the question solely as to who was the assailant
in the fatal encounter."
tion that if defendant's good character added to the legal presumption of
innocence raised any doubt in the minds of the jurors they should render
a verdict of acquittal.
""When there is no evidence that deceased made an assault, evidence of
threats made by him is not admissible for any purpose." State v. Alex-
ander (1877), 66 Mo. 148; 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 523; State v. Taylor (1877) 64
Mo. 358.
" Supra.
k 1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE, (2d ed.) Sec. 63.
" (1906), 148 Cal. 564, 83 P. 993.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
There may be some who will quarrel with the policy of admit-
ting evidence that is logically relevant solely as corroborative
evidence. But this policy is not new to the law. It has been
pointed out above that in the admission of character evidence
to show the reasonableness of the accused's conduct, and in the
admission of threats, it is held that there must be doubt as to
whether the accused acted maliciously or from a well-grounded
apprehension of immediate bodily harm, or as to who was the
aggressor. It is also noted that the good reputation of the ac-
cused is not a sufficient basis for a verdict of acquittal.
This same policy arises in other branches of the law. In prov-
ing the contents of a lost will it is generally held that neither
ante-testamentary nor post-testamentary declarations standing
alone are sufficient to prove the will. And in criminal cases it
is held that a confession of guilt or the testimony of an accom-
plice is not sufficient to support a verdict of guilt. Here the
question is not one of admissibility but of sufficiency of evidence,
and it is the duty of the court to instruct the return of a verdict
of acquittal if there is no other evidence. But the court cannot
instruct that a verdict of guilt be brought in. Therefore, to safe-
guard against a prejudicial verdict of acquittal (assuming that
the unknown bad reputation of the victim is the only evidence
offered to show aggression) and to keep the jury within the
bounds of reason, it is deemed advisable to attach to the admis-
sibility of evidence of unknown character a requisite that there
be some other evidence upon the point.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF REPUTATION EVIDENCE REGARDING THE VIC-
TIM, OFFERED BY THE STATE
Missouri decisions are unanimous in holding that the defend-
ant must attack the reputation of the victim before the state may
offer evidence of his reputation for peace and good citizenship.A
There is some question as to what constitutes an attack upon
the reputation of the victim; namely, Is the raising of an issue
of self-defense sufficient, 5 or must there be actual evidence of
'State v. Ross (Mo. 1915), 178 S. W. 475; State v. Woodward (1905),
191 Mo. 617, 90 S. W. 90; State v. Reed (1913), 250 Mo. 379, 157 S. W. 316;
State v. Dixon (Mo., 1916), 190 S. W. 290.
" Thrawley v. State (1899), 153 Ind. 375, 55 N. E. 95 and State v. Wil-
kins (1914), 72 Or. 77, 142 P. 589, support this theory.
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bad reputation offered by the accused? The Missouri courts, in
accord with the weight of authority, hold that the accused must
offer actual evidence of the bad reputation of the victim before
the state may offer evidence of his good reputation.-
In State ,v. Reed,59 a judgment of conviction was reversed on
the ground that the state was permitted to introduce evidence
of the good reputation of the victim after the defendant had
testified that the deceased was trying to rob him. The court says
that this precise issue had not been raised in the appellate courts
before. The Feeley case is distinguished on the ground that
there the evidence was offered by the defendant to show the bad
reputation of the deceased under certain conditions, while in the
instant case the evidence only tends to show a specific criminal
act on the part of deceased and was also offered to mitigate or
excuse the act of the defendant. The court perceives the
relevancy of the evidence but fears that it "would be making a
precedent which would open up a Pandora's box of collateral is-
sues to be let into every case, and thereby confuse juries even
more extensively than under our present system." The opinion
continues: "There are always many collateral issues that re-
sourceful attorneys could inject into all kinds of suits
might throw some indirect light upon the real issue tendered
by the parties." It concludes that the defendant must introduce
evidence which directly attacks the general reputation of the
victim for peace and quietude before the state can introduce
contrary evidence. The rule enunciated in the Reed case has
been rigidly followed in Missouri. In State 'v. Dixon6' the court
held that evidence offered by the defendant that the victim was
drunk in the afternoon of the tragedy and had been running his
horse along the highway and yelling was not such an attack
upon the reputation of the deceased as would permit the state
to offer evidence of his good reputation.
Mr. Wigmore criticizes the Reed case62 and agrees with the
"Supra, note 52.
"Supra, note 56.
194 Mo. 300, where the state was permitted to introduce evidence of the
good reputation of the victim when not drinking to rebut the evidence of-
fered by defendant of the victim's bad reputation when drinking.
" Supra, note 56.
"1 Wigmore, EVIDENCE (2d ed.), Sec. 63: "Is it not a pity that these
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minority view. He says, "The state also can of course offer the
deceased's peaceable character, when the issue of self-defense
has been raised, even though the defendant has not first intro-
duced the deceased's violent character; though most courts thus
far are singularly loath to accept this dictate of logic and
fairness."
resourceful attorneys are not matched by resourceful judges? And is it the
law's fault that the resourceful judge is not permitted to checkmate the
chicanery of the resourceful attorney?"
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